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 Doubtless many readers of Philosophical Studies , a paradigmatic example of a
 journal devoted to hard-nosed analytic philosophy, were surprised to discover an
 article entitled "A New Theory of Laughter" in a recent issue of that journal. I am not
 now poking fun at the word "new," either (but see below). What is surprising, rather,
 is that there should have been an article on laughter at all. On the whole, laughter has
 not been a high priority topic in the history of philosophy, and those thinkers who
 have given it more than a cursory treatment would - with the likely exception of
 Hobbes - not be regarded with favor or even as bona fide philosophers by analytic
 philosophers.
 The above-mentioned article (Morreall, 1982) was a refreshing attempt to intro-
 duce the topic of laughter to these practitioners of that critical style of philosophizing
 that has (loosely) come to be known as "analytic." Taking Laughter Seriously con-
 tinues in this vein.
 Part One expands upon the groundwork laid in the article, providing a more
 detailed argument structure and a more complex reading of the thesis previously
 advanced. Part Two proceeds with an informal discussion of the variety of humor,
 humor as aesthetic experience, humor as a force for mental liberation and positive
 social interaction, and humor as providing a meaning to life.
 While Part Two makes for interesting and enjoyable reading and is not to be
 disparaged, the theoretical thrust of the book lies with Part One, which therefore
 holds the most interest for theoretical psychologists, philosophical psychologists,
 and philosophers of mind. So with this interdisciplinary group in mind, I will focus
 my discussion on the contents of Part One.
 Morreall begins with a critical discussion of three of the most well-known accounts
 of laughter, viz. ( 1) the superiority theory , according to which laughter is an expression
 of a person's feeling of superiority - which may involve triumph, domination, deri-
 sion, etc. - over others; (2) the incongruity theory , according to which laughter is
 produced when our experiences run counter to the orderly patterns we have come to
 expect; and (3) the relief theory, according to which laughter is a release of the nervous
 energy.
 Morreall 's treatment of these theories is detailed and informative, and of course his
 conclusion that each of them fails of sufficient generality to cover all cases of laughter
 is utterly convincing. The trouble is that not everyone who holds such theories holds
 them in the simplistic versions that Morreall has singled out for attack. Morreall
 admits this, but claims that it is unnecessary to examine other variants of these
 theories because they would likewise fail of comprehensiveness. This is surely too
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 quick, though. Gregory ( 1924), for example, holds a genetic relief theory, according to
 which present-day laughter has evolved from, and often still evinces a primitive
 release function. Clearly the mere citing of examples of current laughter not involving
 release would not suffice to invalidate such a theory, and in not addressing such
 variants, Morreall weakens the motivation for his own account.
 Having dispatched his representative versions of the traditional theories, Morreall
 presents a "new" - albeit not brand-new (cf. Sully 1902/1907, p. 75) - theory of
 laughter according to which laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift . A "shift"
 is to be understood as a sudden change, and "results" is intended to convey that "...
 laughter is neither the psychological shift itself, nor the pleasant feeling produced by
 the shift. Laughter is rather the physical activity which is caused by, and which
 expresses the feeling produced by, the shift" (p. 39). This theory, Morreall is
 confident, will provide the key to understanding all cases of laughter.
 Morreall's italicized formula seeks to express a necessary, but not a sufficient
 condition for the occurrence of laughter. As such, the condition it expresses could of
 course be satisfied by all sorts of things other than laughter. So the heuristic value of
 the characterization will ultimately turn on what the characterization nets along with
 the varied laughter phenomena missed by previous theories. If the other things
 besides laughter that result from pleasant psychological shifts turn out to be con-
 nected in interesting ways to laughter - say, if together with laughter they constituted
 some unified domain of behaviors - we would have a much more interesting neces-
 sary condition for laughter than otherwise. I am skeptical of this eventuality, but
 would not deny that there is a worthy research proposal lurking here.
 But does MorrealPs formula succeed in expressing a necessary condition? Else-
 where, I have suggested it does not (Pfeifer, 1983). Morreall considers the case of
 embarrassed laughter as a possible counterexample to his characterization in that it
 does not seem to involve a change to a pleasant psychological state. His claims that
 embarrassed laughter is merely feigned laughter - so presumably not laughter, strictly
 speaking? - is not very compelling. (Furthermore, alluding to the matter of motiva-
 tion again, MorrealPs explanation of why embarrassed laughter is contrived even
 when it does not appear to be is genetic. So he has availed himself of a move not
 conceded to the traditional theories of laughter.) Hysterical laughter, another seem-
 ingly clear counterexample to the pleasantness required by MorrealPs formula, is
 treated in a similar fashion, but with involuntary mechanisms to do the contriving.
 As far as the suddenness inherent in the psychological shift is concerned, one need
 only think of the moderately ticklish person, whose pleasurable feelings build up
 gradually before erupting in laughter.
 Finally, Morreall sets aside certain cases, such as laughter caused by hypothalamic
 lesions in multiple sclerosis or epilepsy, as irrelevant to his theory as a theory of
 laughter qua psychological response. This of course invokes certain views about the
 autonomy of psychology from physiology which many would resist, but which might
 turn out to have merit, for all that.
 Granting Morreall the last point, there is another question concerning his claim
 that all the prima facie counterexamples to his theory of the psychological pheno-
 menon of laughter, that is the non-standard cases of laughter involving embarrass-
 ment, hysteria, etc., are somehow parasitic on the standard cases.
 In a sense that is a boring claim to make, for non-standard cases are typically
 explained in terms of deviations from the standard cases and vice versa. What is of
 interest here, however, is the form such explanations are to take. The underlying
 intuition suggested by MorrealPs handling of putative counterexamples is this:
 Laughing to a "purpose" - in some sense that excludes both mere reacting and mere
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 playacting (cf. McGinn, 1983, pp. 84-85) may divorce laughter from its function of
 expressing pleasant feeling, but one would have no call to laugh to that purpose if
 laughter did not standardly have that function in the first place. That is, achieving the
 purpose depends in some causal way on the pre-existence of that function.
 Something like that may indeed be true. But I think such a "parasitology" of
 laughter points to a basic confusion on Morreall's part concerning tha nature of his
 formulaic theory and what properly constitutes a counterexample to it. There are
 several ways of making this point, an easy way being this: Morreall's confusion is one
 of holding that indicating how a formula which expresses a general truth about
 standard cases can be used in explaining nonstandard cases is tantamount to showing
 that the formula as such is true of the non-standard cases too. Once this implicit
 assumption is seen in its naked form, it is obvious that it takes more than parasites to
 undermine putative counterexamples to the account of laughter.
 My criticisms and misgivings notwithstanding, it should be clear from the forego-
 ing that Morreall has presented us with an exciting set of problems concerning
 laughter and a framework suitable for pursuing them at greater length. Readers can
 expect to have a stimulating and enjoyable time with this book.
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